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Abstract
We study identiﬁcation in static, simultaneous move ﬁnite games of complete information,
where the presence of multiple Nash equilibria may lead to partial identiﬁcation of the model pa-
rameters. The identiﬁcation regions for these parameters proposed in the related literature are
known not to be sharp. Using the theory of random sets, we show that the sharp identiﬁcation
region can be obtained as the set of minimizers of the distance from the conditional distribution
of game’s outcomes given covariates, to the conditional Aumann expectation given covariates of
ap r o p e r l yd e ﬁned random set. This is the random set of probability distributions over action
proﬁles given proﬁt shifters implied by mixed strategy Nash equilibria. The sharp identiﬁcation
region can be approximated arbitrarily accurately through a ﬁnite number of moment inequal-
ities based on the support function of the conditional Aumann expectation. When only pure
strategy Nash equilibria are played, the sharp identiﬁcation region is exactly determined by
a ﬁnite number of moment inequalities. We discuss how our results can be extended to other
solution concepts, such as for example correlated equilibrium or rationality and rationalizability.
We show that calculating the sharp identiﬁcation region using our characterization is com-
putationally feasible. We also provide a simple algorithm which ﬁnds the set of inequalities that
need to be checked in order to insure sharpness. We use examples analyzed in the literature to
illustrate the gains in identiﬁcation aﬀorded by our method.
Keywords:I d e n t i ﬁcation, Random Sets, Aumann Expectation, Support Function, Capacity
Functional, Normal Form Games, Inequality Constraints.
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This paper belongs to the literature on identiﬁcation in incomplete econometric models. Examples
of such models may arise when the data are incomplete (sample realizations are not fully observable)
or when the model asserts that the relationship between the outcome variable and the exogenous
variables is a correspondence rather than a function. When the econometric model is incomplete,
the sampling process and the maintained assumptions may be consistent with a set of parameter
vectors or functionals, rather than a single one. In this case, the model is partially identiﬁed. The
analyses in Manski (1989, 2003), Manski and Tamer (2002), Haile and Tamer (2003), Ciliberto and
Tamer (2004) and Andrews, Berry, and Jia (2004) are examples of research studying the identiﬁed
features of incomplete econometric models.
Our main contribution is to provide a simple and novel procedure to determine the sharp identi-
ﬁcation region of the parameters characterizing static, simultaneous move ﬁnite games of complete
information in the presence of multiple Nash equilibria. By contrast, the identiﬁcation region for
this class of models provided in the related literature is known not to be sharp. Establishing whether
a conjectured region for the identiﬁed features of an incomplete model is sharp is a key question in
identiﬁcation analysis. For simplicity, we focus on the parametric case. An econometric model then
consists of a sampling process and a set of mainta i n e dm o d e l i n ga s s u m p t i o n ss u m m a r i z e db ya n
unknown ﬁnite dimensional parameter vector θ. This vector, or one of its subvectors, is the focus of
empirical research. Given the joint distribution of the observed variables, a researcher asks herself
what parameters θ are consistent with this distribution. The region in the parameter space which
includes all possible parameter values that could generate the same distribution of observables for
some data generation process consistent with the maintained modeling assumptions, and no other
parameter value, is called the sharp identiﬁcation region. Examples of sharp identiﬁcation regions
for parameters of incomplete models are given in Manski (2003) and Manski and Tamer (2002),
among others. In some cases, researchers are only able to characterize a region in the parameter
space that includes all the parameter values that may have generated the observables, but may
include other (infeasible) parameter values as well. These larger regions are called outer regions.
Examples of outer regions for parameters of incomplete models are given in Ciliberto and Tamer
(2004) and Andrews, Berry, and Jia (2004). The inclusion in the outer regions of parameter values
which are infeasible may weaken the model’s ability to make useful predictions, and the researcher’s
ability to test for model misspeciﬁcation.
Point identiﬁcation of the class of models treated in this paper has been previously studied by
1Bjorn and Vuong (1985), Bresnahan and Reiss (1988, 1990, 1991), Berry (1992), Mazzeo (2002),
Tamer (2003), and Bajari, Hong, and Ryan (2007) among others. These authors achieve point
identiﬁcation of the payoﬀ parameters by adding assumptions to the model.1 Examples of such
restrictions include assumptions on the nature of competition, heterogeneity of ﬁrms, availability
of covariates with suﬃciently large support and/or instrumental variables, and restrictions on the
selection mechanism which, in the data generating process, picks an equilibrium in the regions
of multiplicity. By contrast, we do not impose any assumption on the selection mechanism, on
the nature of competition, or on the form of heterogeneity across players. Our approach does
not require availability of covariates with large support or instruments, but fully exploits their
identifying power if they are present. Andrews, Berry, and Jia (2004), Ciliberto and Tamer (2004),
and Berry and Tamer (2007) study partial identiﬁcation of the same class of models as we do.
Their work is the closest in spirit to ours. However, they only provide outer regions for the model
parameters.
While throughout most of the paper we assume that players follow Nash behavior, we show
that our methodology easily extends to other solution concepts for the game. We illustrate this
by looking at games where rationality of level-1 is the solution concept (a problem ﬁrst studied by
Aradillas-Lopez and Tamer (2008)), and by looking at games where correlated equilibrium is the
solution concept.2
Our paper is exclusively about identiﬁcation. However, our characterization of the sharp identi-
ﬁcation region leads to an obvious sample analog counterpart which can be used when the researcher
is confronted with a ﬁnite sample of observations. This sample analog is given by the set of min-
imizers of a criterion function obtained from a ﬁnite number of sample moment equalities and
inequalities, so that the recent contributions of Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2007), Andrews
and Guggenberger (2007), Andrews and Soares (2007), Galichon and Henry (2006), Romano and
Shaikh (2006), Rosen (2006), and Pakes, Porter, Ho, and Ishii (2006), among others, can be applied
for estimation and statistical inference.
1.1 Overview
T h el i t e r a t u r eo ni d e n t i ﬁcation in games with multiple equilibria often describes the sharp identiﬁ-
cation region of the model parameters using the concept of “selection mechanism.” An admissible
1Tamer (2003) also suggests an approach to partially identify the model’s parameters when no additional assump-
tions are imposed.
2Yang (2008) exploits the fact that all Nash equilibria are correlated equilibria to provide simple-to-compute outer
regions for the model parameters when Nash equilibrium is the solution concept.
2selection mechanism is the probability distribution of a random variable which chooses the equi-
librium played in the regions of the sample space where the model admits multiple equilibria. By
deﬁnition, the sharp identiﬁcation region includes all the parameter values for which one can ﬁnd
an admissible selection mechanism, such that the model augmented with this selection mechanism
generates the joint distribution of the observed variables. If, as it is the case in this paper, no
assumptions are placed on it, the selection mechanism may represent an inﬁnite dimensional nui-
sance parameter. Hence, “standard” approaches to characterizing the sharp identiﬁcation region,
which are based on the selection mechanism, entail dealing with an inﬁnite dimensional nuisance
parameter. This task is suﬃciently diﬃcult that Berry and Tamer (2007, page 68) have suggested
to give up on obtaining sharp identiﬁcation regions. Rather, they suggest focusing on outer regions
for the model parameters that do not exploit all the information contained in the model, but are
practically appealing because they are deﬁn e db yaﬁnite number of moment inequalities. These
moment inequalities have to hold for x−a.s., with x the observable payoﬀ shifters (in what follows,
for simplicity we do not keep repeating that all statements concerning moment inequalities and set
membership have to hold for x − a.s.).
The methodology that we propose allows us to bypass the need to directly deal with inﬁnite
dimensional nuisance parameters. Our treatment of the problem distinguishes between two cases.
When only pure strategies are considered, the main beneﬁt of our approach is that the sharp
identiﬁcation region is obtained through a ﬁnite number of moment inequalities. When mixed
strategies are also allowed, one loses the ability to characterize the sharp identiﬁcation region
through a ﬁnite number of moment inequalities. Intuitively, this is because there is additional
information provided by the fact that players must be indiﬀerent among the actions that they play
with positive probability according to a given equilibrium strategy.3 However, we show that even
in this case one can approximate the sharp identiﬁcation region arbitrarily accurately through a
ﬁnite number of moment inequalities.
We achieve our results by using the theory of random sets (Molchanov (2005)). The key insight
that leads to our characterization of the sharp identiﬁcation region is the following. Suppose that
the researcher observes game’s outcomes y and payoﬀ shifters x from a cross section of markets
i nw h i c hp l a y e r sp l a yt h es a m eg a m ea n df o l l o wN a s hb e h a v i o r . P r o ﬁts also depend on payoﬀ
shifters ε that are unobservable by the econometrician, but observable by the players (the game
is one of complete information). Let the cross section be large enough that the distribution of y
conditional on x, denoted P(y|x), can be learned exactly. Parametrize the payoﬀ functions of
3Section 4 further discusses this fact.
3the game, and ﬁx a given value of the parameter vector θ. Each realization of x and ε implies a
(necessarily non-empty) set of mixed strategy Nash equilibria, which we denote by Sθ (x,ε). Each of
the equilibria in this set determines a probability distribution over the game’s outcomes, conditional
on the realization of x and ε. Let the random closed set of probability distributions over the game’s
outcomes implied by Sθ (x,ε) be denoted Q(Sθ (x,ε)). In Section 3 we establish that the entire
collection of model’s predicted probability distributions of the game’s outcomes conditional on x is
given by the Aumann expectation of Q(Sθ (x,ε)) conditional on x, denoted E(Q(Sθ (x,ε))|x).4
Framing the set of the model’s predicted probability distributions in terms of an Aumann
expectation is practically very advantageous. A candidate value for the parameter vector may
have generated the observed conditional distribution P(y|x) if and only if P(y|x) belongs to
the conditional Aumann expectation associated with that parameter vector. Hence, the sharp
identiﬁcation region of the model parameters is given by the collection of θ’s that determine a
conditional Aumann expectation E(Q(Sθ (x,ε))|x) that contains P(y|x) for x − a.s.
Given a candidate value for θ, one can verify whether it belongs to the sharp identiﬁcation
region in the following way. The set E(Q(Sθ (x,ε))|x) can be evaluated exactly or approximated
by simulation, depending on the complexity of the game. The candidate parameter vector θ is in
the sharp identiﬁcation region if and only if P(y|x) is an element of this set. This corresponds
to checking whether the support function of P(y|x) is dominated by the support function of
E(Q(Sθ (x,ε))|x).5 Showing that one support function dominates another amounts to checking
an inﬁnite number of inequalities, each associated with a point on a unit sphere of an appropriate
dimension. A ﬁnite set of moment inequalities can be obtained by discretizing this unit sphere.
The properties of this approximation are discussed in Section 5.2.
A substantial simpliﬁcation is possible in the special case where one assumes that players do
not randomize across their actions, and pure strategy Nash equilibria exist (see Assumption 4). We
show that the number of inequalities to be checked in order to assure that the support function of
P(y|x) is dominated by the support function of E(Q(Sθ (x,ε))|x) is ﬁnite, without the need to
discretize the unit sphere. This is because when players are only allowed to play pure strategies,
E(Q(Sθ (x,ε))|x) is a closed convex polytope, fully characterized by a ﬁnite number of supporting
hyperplanes, i.e., by its support function evaluated at a ﬁnite number of directions in the unit
sphere. These directions are trivial to determine. We connect this result to a related notion in
4We formally deﬁne the notions of both random closed set and Aumann expectation in Section 3.
5See Schneider (1993, Section 1.7) for a thorough discussion of the support function of a closed convex set, and
its properties.
4the theory of random sets, that of a capacity functional, which is the probability distribution of
a random closed set. We show that our characterization of the sharp identiﬁcation region based
on the support function of E(Q(Sθ (x,ε))|x) is dual to a characterization based on the capacity
functional of the random set of pure strategy equilibrium outcomes, by exploiting a result due
to Artstein (1983). While the number of inequalities to be checked in order to obtain the sharp
identiﬁcation region is ﬁnite, in some applications it may be quite large. However, we show that in
some cases this number can be substantially reduced by exploiting basic notions of set algebra.
There are no precedents to our characterization of the sharp identiﬁcation region of the payoﬀ
function parameters characterizing static, simultaneous move ﬁnite games of complete information
in the presence of multiple Nash equilibria. However, there are two precedents, with respect to this
paper, to the use of the theory of random sets within the econometrics literature. Both of them are
mainly focused on statistical inference. One is given by the work of Beresteanu and Molinari (2006,
2008). They study a class of partially identiﬁed models in which the sharp identiﬁcation region
of the parameter vector of interest can be written as a transformation of the Aumann expectation
of a properly deﬁned random set.6 For this class of models, they propose to use a sample analog
estimator given by a transformation of a Minkowski average of properly deﬁned random sets. They
use limit theorems for independent and identically distributed sequences of random sets, to establish
consistency of this estimator with respect to the Hausdorﬀ metric. They propose two Wald-type test
statistics, based on the Hausdorﬀ metric and on the lower Hausdorﬀ hemimetric, to test hypothesis
and make conﬁdence statements about the entire sharp identiﬁcation region and its subsets.
The other is given by the work of Galichon and Henry (2006). The goal of their paper is
to provide a speciﬁcation test for partially identiﬁed structural models. They introduce various
formulations of the notion of a correctly speciﬁed structural model which is partially identiﬁed,
and establish their equivalence. One of the notions that they use is based on the (Choquet)
capacity functional of a random set. In particular, they show that the model is correctly speciﬁed
if the distribution of the observed outcome is dominated by the capacity functional of the random
correspondence between the latent variables and the outcome variables characterizing the model.
This allows them to extend the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of correct model speciﬁcation to partially
identiﬁed models. They then deﬁne the notion of “core determining” classes of sets, to ﬁnd a
manageable class of sets for which to check that the dominance condition is satisﬁed.
6In order to establish sharpness of the identiﬁcation region of the parameters of a best linear predictor with
interval outcome data, Beresteanu and Molinari (2006, 2008) use the same result involving the capacity functional of
a random set due to Artstein (1983) that we use in this paper.
51.2 Structure of the Paper
In Section 2 we introduce notation and assumptions, and present the identiﬁcation problem for the
class of models treated in this paper. In order to clearly connect our work to the related literature,
we discuss the deﬁnition of the sharp identiﬁcation region provided by Berry and Tamer (2007).
In Section 3 we give a computationally feasible characterization of the sharp identiﬁcation region
when players may randomize across their actions. We illustrate the gains in identiﬁcation aﬀorded
by our methodology through the simple example of a two player entry game. In Section 4 we
show how our approach further simpliﬁes when only pure strategy Nash equilibria are played. We
illustrate the gains in identiﬁcation aﬀorded by our methodology through the simple example of a
four player, two type entry game. In Section 5 we address the computational issues associated with
our characterization of the sharp identiﬁcation region. We ﬁrst discuss how E(Q(Sθ (x,ε))|x) and
its support function can be approximated by simulation. We then show how one can use the result
of this simulation to compute the sharp identiﬁcation region in the case that only pure strategies
are considered. We also provide a very simple algorithm that may allow one to signiﬁcantly reduce
the number of inequalities to check, in order to obtain the sharp identiﬁcation region. Finally, we
discuss how to approximate the sharp identiﬁcation region when mixed strategies are played. In
Section 6 we show how our methodology can be extended to the case that players are only assumed
to be level-1 rational, or are assumed to play correlated strategies. Section 7 concludes. Appendix
A collects all the proofs. Appendix B gives additional details about one of our examples, a two
player entry game with mixed strategies.
2 Notation, Assumptions, and Identiﬁcation Problem
We focus on simultaneous-move games of complete information (normal form games) in which each
player has a ﬁnite set of pure strategies. A key example is the static game of entry, in which each
player can choose between two actions: “enter” or “not enter.” Partial identiﬁcation of this model
is studied by Andrews, Berry, and Jia (2004, ABJ henceforth), Ciliberto and Tamer (2004, CT
henceforth) and Berry and Tamer (2007).
2.1 Notation and Assumptions
Throughout the paper, we use capital Latin letters to denote sets and random sets. We use lower
case Latin letters for random vectors. We denote parameter vectors and sets of parameter vectors,
respectively by θ and Θ. For a given ﬁnite set W, we denote by κW its cardinality. Given two
6nonempty sets B,C ⊂ <d, we denote by





ρH (C,B)=m a x {dH (C,B),d H (B,C)},
respectively, the directed Hausdorﬀ distance from C to B and the Hausdorﬀ distance between C
and B. The Hausdorﬀ norm of B is denoted kBkH = ρH (B,{0})=s u p{kbk : b ∈ B}.
We let J denote the number of players. Each player has a ﬁnite set of actions (pure strategies)
Aj,j=1 ,...,J. We denote by a =( a1,...,a J) ∈ A a generic vector specifying an action for
each player (a pure strategy proﬁle), with A = ×J
j=1Aj. We denote by πj (aj,a −j,x j,ε j,θ) the
payoﬀ function for player j, where a−j is the vector of player j’s opponents’ actions, xj ∈ X is a
vector of observable payoﬀ shifters, εj is a payoﬀ shifter observed by the players but unobserved
by the econometrician, and θ ∈ Θ ⊂ <p is a vector of parameters to be estimated, with Θ the
parameter space. We denote by σj : Aj → [0,1] the mixed strategy for player j that assigns to
each action aj ∈ Aj a probability σj (aj) ≥ 0 that it is played, with
P
aj∈Aj σj (aj)=1for each
j =1 ,...,J.We let ∆(Aj) denote the mixed extension of Aj, and ∆(A)=×J
j=1∆(Aj). With the
usual slight abuse of notation, we denote by πj (σj,σ−j,x j,ε j,θ) the expected payoﬀ associated
with the mixed strategy proﬁle σ =( σ1,...,σJ). We denote by y ∈ Y the vector of potentially
observable outcomes of the game. In the remainder of this section, we formalize our assumptions
on the games and sampling processes.
Assumption 1 (i) The set A of pure strategy proﬁles and the set Y of potentially observable out-
comes are ﬁnite. Each player has a ﬁnite number κAj ≥ 2 of pure strategies to choose from. The
number of players is J ≥ 2.
(ii) Players follow Nash behavior. They move simultaneously and only once.
(iii) The strategy proﬁles determine the outcomes observable by the econometrician through a contin-
uous mapping g : A → Y, the “outcome rule”. This outcome rule is known by the econometrician.
(iv) The parametric form of the payoﬀ functions πj (aj,a −j,x j,ε j,θ),j=1 ,...,J, is known, and
for a known action ¯ a it is normalized to πj (¯ aj,¯ a−j,x j,ε j,θ)=0for each j. The payoﬀ functions are
continuous in the observable and unobservable payoﬀ shifters. The parameter space Θ is compact.
Assumption 1-(i) assures that there is a ﬁnite set of strategies for each player, and a ﬁnite set of
possible outcomes observable by the econometrician. It restricts attention to normal form games.
Part (ii) of the assumption requires that players follow Nash behavior, so that for given payoﬀ
shifters xj and εj, the mixed strategy proﬁle σ constitutes a Nash equilibrium if each player’s
7mixed strategy is a best response. Part (iii) of the assumption requires continuity of the outcome
rule. Part (iv) of the assumption requires continuity of the payoﬀ functions in xj and εj. These
conditions are needed to establish measurability and closedness of certain sets. Assumption 1-
(iv) also provides a location normalization. Such normalization is implicit in entry models, where
players are commonly assumed to earn zero payoﬀs if they do not enter the market (regardless of
the action chosen by their opponents).
In many normal form games, such as the static simultaneous move entry games analyzed by
ABJ, CT, and Berry and Tamer (2007), players’ actions and the outcomes observable by the
econometrician coincide. We simplify the exposition in all that follows, by restricting attention to
games satisfying this condition:
Assumption 2 The outcome rule g(·) is the identity mapping, so that y = a.
Our results, however, apply to the more general case stated in Assumption 1-(iii), as we illustrate
in Section 4.2 with a simple example.
Assumption 3 The econometrician observes a random sample (yi,x i)
n
i=1 of equilibrium outcomes
and observable payoﬀ shifters from a large cross section of n markets drawn from a population
distribution that satisﬁes Assumption 1. The outcome vector for market i is yi =( yi1,...,y iJ). The
observed matrix of payoﬀ shifters for market i, xi, is comprised of the non-redundant elements of xji,
j =1 ,...,J (the observable payoﬀ shifters of ﬁrm j in market i). The unobserved random vector
εi =( ε1i,...,ε Ji) is independently and identically distributed across i with a distribution function
F that is known up to a ﬁnite dimensional parameter that is part of θ. The random vectors (y,x,ε)
are deﬁned on a non-atomic product probability space (Ω,F,P)=( Ω1,F1,P1) × (Ω2,F2,P2).
A s s u m p t i o n3a l l o w su st oi d e n t i f yP(y|x), the population distribution of observed equilibrium
outcomes given covariates. Since our focus in this paper is identiﬁcation, we treat identiﬁed distri-
butions as population distributions.
The requirement that the probability space is non-atomic is fairly weak and facilitates some
of the technical details below. We use a product probability space to clearly diﬀerentiate between
the randomness in the payoﬀ functions due to the payoﬀ shifters, represented by Ω1, and the
randomness in the actions taken by the players for a given mixed strategy proﬁle, represented by
Ω2. Hence, for any ω1 ∈ Ω1,ω 2 ∈ Ω2, (x(ω1,ω2),ε(ω1,ω2)) = (x(ω1),ε(ω1)). On the other hand,
y(ω1,ω2) depends both on ω1, which determines the equilibrium mixed strategy proﬁles σ(ω1),
8and ω2, which determines the speciﬁc action taken by the players when they randomize according
to the mixed strategy proﬁle σ(ω1).
2.2 The Identiﬁcation Problem
It is well known that the games and sampling processes satisfying Assumptions 1-3 may lead
to multiple Nash equilibria. Multiplicity implies that there are regions of values of the exogenous
variables where the econometric model predicts more than one outcome. Therefore, the relationship
between the outcome variable of interest and the exogenous variables is a correspondence rather
than a function. Hence, the parameters of the payoﬀ functions may not be point identiﬁed, see for
example Berry and Tamer (2007) for a thorough discussion of this problem.
Nevertheless, these parameters can be partially identiﬁed given knowledge of P(y|x) for all x. In
particular, their identiﬁcation region is given by the set of parameter vectors which are consistent
with the sampling process and the maintained modeling assumptions, and therefore may have
generated the distribution of observables. If the conjectured region for the parameters of interest
contains all its observationally equivalent feasible values and no other, the region is sharp. Berry and
Tamer (2007, equation (2.21), page 67) provide an abstract formulation for the sharp identiﬁcation
region in a two player entry model. Here we report their formulation, modiﬁed to allow for games
with more than two players and two actions. This formulation, however, requires the introduction
of an inﬁnite dimensional nuisance parameter, and thus is considered to be impractical. In the next
section we show that an alternative and practical formulation, which avoids the need for an inﬁnite
dimensional nuisance parameter, delivers the same sharp identiﬁcation region.
We start with some additional notation. Let Sθ (x,ε) denote the set of mixed strategy Nash
equilibria associated with a speciﬁc realization of the payoﬀ shifters x and ε (this set is deﬁned
formally in equation (3.2) below). Let ψ (σ;Sθ (x,ε)) denote a selection mechanism giving the
probability that an equilibrium σ ∈ Sθ (x,ε) is selected. Observe that for this selection mech-
anism to be admissible it is required that ψ(σ;Sθ (x,ε)) ≥ 0 for all σ ∈ Sθ (x,ε),a n dt h a t
P
σ∈Sθ(x,ε) ψ(σ;Sθ (x,ε)) = 1. This summation is well deﬁned because except on a set of x,ε
realizations of measure zero, the set Sθ (x,ε) contains a ﬁnite number of equilibria (Wilson (1971)).
Notice that the equilibrium selection mechanism ψ is left unspeciﬁed and can depend on market
unobservables. Then we have the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 1 In a game which satisﬁes Assumptions 1-3, the sharp identiﬁcation region for the






θ ∈ Θ :














where ψ is an admissible equilibrium selection mechanism as described above.
Let P(y|x;θ,ψ) denote the integral on the right hand side of the second line of equation (2.1) above.
Berry and Tamer explain this formulation and the practical diﬃculties involved in computing the
set Θ 
I as follows (page 68):
“The set Θ 
I is the sharp identiﬁed set, i.e., the set of parameters θ that are consistent
with the data and the model. Heuristically, a θ ∈ Θ 
I if and only if there exists a (proper)
selection mechanism ψ (...) such that the induced probability distribution P{y|x;θ,ψ}
matches the choice probabilities P(y|x) for all x almost everywhere. So, the presence
of multiple equilibria introduces nuisance parameters that are not speciﬁed and hence
makes it harder to identify the parameter θ. (...) Inference on the set Θ 
I based on
deﬁnition (2.1) [(2.21) in the original] though theoretically attractive is not practically
feasible since one needs to deal with inﬁnite dimensional nuisance parameters (the ψ’s).
A practical approach to inference in this class of models follows the approach in Ciliberto
and Tamer (2004) by exploiting the fact that the selection mechanism ψ is a probability
and hence bounded between zero and one. Although this approach does not provide a
sharp set, it is practically attractive.”
In the following sections we provide a tractable characterization of the sharp identiﬁcation
region. In the special case that players play only pure strategy Nash equilibria (Section 4 below),
we show that the sharp identiﬁcation region is given by a ﬁnite number of moment inequalities
which have to hold for x − a.s.
3 The Sharp Identiﬁcation Region
3.1 The Random Set of Mixed Strategy Equilibrium Proﬁles
We assume that players in each market follow Nash behavior. For a given realization of x and ε,
the mixed strategy proﬁle σ =( σ1,...,σJ) constitutes a Nash equilibrium if
(3.1) πj (σj,σ−j,x j,ε j,θ) ≥ πj (˜ σj,σ−j,x j,ε j,θ) ∀˜ σj ∈ ∆(Aj) ∀j.
10Hence, we deﬁne the following θ-dependent set:
(3.2) Sθ (x,ε)={σ ∈ ∆(A):πj (σj,σ−j,x j,ε j,θ) ≥ πj (˜ σj,σ−j,x j,ε j,θ) ∀˜ σj ∈ ∆(Aj) ∀j}.
For a given value of θ and realization of x and ε, this is the set of mixed strategy Nash equilibrium
proﬁles. For ease of notation we write Sθ ≡ Sθ (x,ε) and omit the explicit reference to x and ε.
Given Assumption 1, Sθ is a random closed set in ∆(A).
Deﬁnition 2 Denoting by F the family of closed subsets of a topological space F,am a pZ : Ω → F
is called a random closed set, also known as a closed set valued random variable, if for every
compact set K in F,Z −1 (K)={ω ∈ Ω : Z (ω) ∩ K 6= ∅} ∈ F.





{σ ∈ ∆(A):πj (σj,σ−j,x j,ε j,θ) ≥ ˜ πj (σ−j,x j,ε j,θ)},
where
˜ πj (σ−j,x j,ε j,θ)= s u p
˜ σj∈∆(Aj)
πj (˜ σj,σ−j,x j,ε j,θ).
Since πj (σj,σ−j,x j,ε j,θ) is a continuous function of σ,xj,ε j, its supremum ˜ πj (σ−j,x j,ε j,θ) is a
continuous function. Therefore Sθ is the ﬁnite intersection of sets deﬁned as solutions of inequalities
for continuous (random) functions. Thus, Sθ is a random closed set, see Molchanov (2005, Section
1.1).
For a given parameter θ ∈ Θ, each element σ(ω1) ∈ Sθ (ω1) P − a.s. determines a distribution
of players’ actions in A1 ×···×A J. Such random elements σ are the selections of Sθ:
Deﬁnition 3 Let Z be a random closed set in a topological space F. A random element z with
values in F is called a (measurable) selection of Z if z(ω) ∈ Z (ω) for almost all ω ∈ Ω. The family
of all selections of Z is denoted by Sel(Z).
Each realization of the selection σ(ω1) ∈ Sθ (ω1) t a k e sv a l u e si n∆(A1) ×···×∆(AJ) and
is one of the admissible mixed strategy Nash equilibrium proﬁles associated with the realizations
x(ω1) and ε(ω1) determined by ω1 ∈ Ω1. As brieﬂy discussed after Assumption 3, the vector
of players actions y(ω1,ω2) depends not only on ω1 through the selection σ(ω1) ∈ Sθ (ω1), but
also on ω2 ∈ Ω2, which determines players’ choice of which action to take in accordance with the
mixed strategy proﬁle σ(ω1). Let σ(ω1)=( σ1 (ω1),...,σJ (ω1)). By deﬁnition of a mixed strategy
11proﬁle, for each j =1 ,...,J, σj (ω1):Aj → [0,1] assigns to each action aj ∈ Aj a probability
σj (ω1,a j) ≥ 0 that it is played, with
P
aj∈Aj σj (ω1,a j)=1 .
Recall that by Assumption 2, the realizations of y coincide with the actions a taken with positive




by the law of iterated expectations, for a given parameter value θ ∈ Θ and selection σ ∈ Sel(Sθ),



























,k =1 ,...,κ Y,
This random point lies in a space of dimension equals to κY a n di ss u c ht h a t[q(σ(ω1))]k ≥ 0 for
each k =1 ,...,κ Y and
PκY
k=1 [q(σ(ω1))]k =1 . Hence, it is an element of the κY − 1 dimensional
simplex, denoted ∆κY−1. The resulting set
(3.4) Q(Sθ)={([q(σ)]k ,k=1 ,...,κ Y):σ ∈ Sel(Sθ)},
is a closed random set in ∆κY−1. Each vector ([q(σ(ω1))]k ,k=1 ,...,κ Y) ∈ Q(Sθ (ω1)) gives the
probability with which each outcome (a J-tuple of actions under Assumption 2) of the game is
observed under the mixed strategy equilibrium σ(ω1) when the realization of x is x(ω1) and the
realization of ε is ε(ω1). Section 3.3 below illustrates these ideas through the simple example of a
two player complete information static game of entry.
3.2 The Sharpness Result
Every realization of q ∈ Sel(Q(Sθ)) is contained in ∆κY−1, and therefore Q(Sθ) is an integrably
bounded random closed set, see Molchanov (2005, Deﬁnition 2.1.11), and all its selections are
integrable. Hence we can deﬁne the set
E(Q(Sθ)|x)={E(q|x):q ∈ Sel(Q(Sθ))}
= {(E([q(σ)]k|x),k=1 ,...,κ Y):σ ∈ Sel(Sθ)}.

















12The set E(Q(Sθ)|x) is the conditional Aumann expectation8 of Q(Sθ). The following example
illustrates the notion of Aumann expectation. To keep it as simple as possible, we omit covariates
and do not base it on a game theoretic model.






























2. Consider the set Ω0
1. Then all selections of Z (ω) for ω ∈ Ω0













for ω ∈ Ω0
1\Ω00
1,
for all measurable Ω00
1 ⊂ Ω0


















the range of expectations of selections depends on the atomic structure of the underlying probabil-
ity space. If the probability space has no atoms, then the possible values for P(Ω00
1|Ω0
1) ﬁll in the
whole segment [0,1].H e n c e ,E(Z|ω ∈ Ω0














































where co[·] denotes the convex hull of the set in square brackets. Hence, in this simple example
E(Z) is a parallelogram. ¤
By Theorem 2.1.46 in Molchanov (2005) the conditional Aumann expectation exists and is
unique. Because by Assumption 3 the probability space is non-atomic,9 and because the random
set Q(Sθ) takes its realizations in a subset of the ﬁnite dimensional space <κY, it follows by Theorem
2.1.15 and Theorem 2.1.24 of Molchanov (2005) that E(Q(Sθ)|x) i sac l o s e dc o n v e xs e tf o rx−a.s.,
and E(Q(Sθ)|x)=E(co[Q(Sθ)]|x).
The set E(Q(Sθ)|x) collects vectors of probabilities with which each outcome of the game can
be observed, by averaging over ω1 ∈ Ω1 the corresponding probability with which each outcome of
the game is observed under the mixed strategy equilibrium σ(ω1). We emphasize that in case of
multiplicity, a diﬀerent mixed strategy equilibrium σ(ω1) ∈ Sθ (ω1) may be selected for each ω1.
If the model is correctly speciﬁed, there exists at least one value of θ ∈ Θ such that the observed
8Aumann (1965) introduces the notion of integrals for set valued functions that we use here.
9When the probability space contains atoms, all the discussion that follows applies, with co[Q(Sθ)] replacing
Q(Sθ).
13conditional distribution of y given x, P(y|x), is a point in the set E(Q(Sθ)|x) for x − a.s.10 Let
the support function of a nonempty closed convex set B ∈ <κY be denoted h(B,·), with
h(B,u)=s u p
b∈B
u0b, u ∈ <κY,
Then P(y|x) ∈ E(Q(Sθ)|x) i fa n do n l yi f









, and where the last equality follows by Theorem
2.1.47-(iv) in Molchanov (2005). Because the support function is positively homogeneous, i.e.,
h(Q(Sθ),cu)=ch(Q(Sθ),u) for all c>0 and for all u ∈ <κY, condition (3.5) is equivalent to
(3.6) u0P(y|x) ≤ E[h(Q(Sθ),u)|x] ∀ u ∈ S,
where S = {u ∈ <κY : kuk =1 } denotes the unit sphere in <κY.
The key result of this paper is the following:
Theorem 3.1 Let Assumptions 1-3 be satisﬁed, and no other information be available. Then
(3.7) ΘI =
©
θ ∈ Θ : u0P(y|x) ≤ E[h(Q(Sθ),u)|x] ∀ u ∈ S x − a.s.
ª
is the sharp identiﬁcation region for the parameter vector θ ∈ Θ.
By standard arguments, condition (3.6) is equivalent to
dH (P(y|x),E(Q(Sθ)|x)) = 0.
Hence, ΘI can be deﬁned in three equivalent ways:
ΘI = {θ ∈ Θ : dH (P(y|x),E(Q(Sθ)|x)) = 0 x − a.s.}
=
©










u ∈ <κY : u1 + ...+ uκY =1and kuk =1
ª
.
The last equality follows because E(Q(Sθ)|x) is a subset of the κY −1 dimensional simplex ∆κY−1.
Therefore, it suﬃces to restrict the directions used in condition (3.6) to those parallel to the
(κY − 1)-dimensional hyperplane that deﬁnes the unit simplex.
10By the deﬁnition of E(Q(Sθ)|x), P(y|x) ∈ E(Q(Sθ)|x) if and only if ∃ q ∈ Sel(Q(Sθ)) : E(q|x)=P(y|x).
14The three deﬁnitions of ΘI given above are equivalent. The deﬁnition based on the support
function can be straightforwardly applied, by discretizing the unit sphere in the relevant space and
checking a ﬁnite number of moment inequalities which have to hold for x−a.s. We discuss in detail
how to do this in Section 5.2 below. In practice, the deﬁnition based on u ∈ S∆ should be preferred
to the one based on S, because S∆ is of a lower dimension than S.
The deﬁnition based on the distance from P(y|x) to E(Q(Sθ)|x) may be used depending on
whether it is computationally more convenient in the speciﬁc application, as it yields a straightfor-




where Fx denotes the joint distribution of x. Clearly, W(θ) ≥ 0 for all θ ∈ Θ, and W(θ)=0if
a n do n l yi fθ ∈ ΘI.
3.3 Example: Two Players Entry Game
In this case Aj = {0,1} for j =1 ,2, A = Y = {0,1}×{ 0,1}, and κY =4 . Let P(y|x)=
[P(y = t|x),t∈ {(0,0),(1,0),(0,1),(1,1)}]. Let σj ∈ [0,1] denote the probability that player j
enters the market, with 1 − σj the probability that he does not. Omit the regressors x in all that
follows, and let players’ payoﬀsb eπj = aj (a−jθj + εj),j=1 ,2. Figure 1 plots the set of mixed
strategy equilibrium proﬁles Sθ resulting from the possible realizations of ε1,ε 2.








(1 − σ1)(1− σ2)










Appendix B provides additional details giving the values of the coordinates of E(q),q∈ Sel(Q(Sθ)),
and relating our approach to the discussion in Berry and Tamer (2007, pages 65-70). In order not to
deal with the inﬁnite dimensional nuisance parameter (the selection mechanism) discussed in sec-
tion 2.2, Berry and Tamer suggest to estimate an outer region for the parameter vector of interest,
based on the insight in CT. Using our notation, their outer region is given by
11This criterion function was used, in the case of pure strategies only, by Ciliberto and Tamer (2004). However, in
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CSθ ((1,0)) ≤ P(y =( 1 ,0)) ≤ CSθ ((1,0)) + P
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¡
ε ∈ Mθ¢








⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎭
,
where Mθ = {ε : ε ∈ [0,−θ1] × [0,−θ2]} and CSθ (σ)=P(Sθ = {σ}),s e eD e ﬁnition 4 below.
Alternatively, one may adopt the insight of ABJ and deﬁne another outer region (which contains
ΘCT
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Appendix B shows that, compared with ΘI as deﬁn e di ne q u a t i o n( 3 . 8 ) ,ΘCT
I and ΘABJ
I are obtained
by checking the support function dominance only for u equal to the canonical basis vectors in <4
(ΘABJ
I ), and by taking the canonical basis vectors in <4 and each of these vectors multiplied by
−1 (ΘCT
I ). Clearly, these inequalities are a small subset of the ones required to obtain the sharp
identiﬁcation region, and therefore give an outer region for θ.
Figure 6 and Table 1 report ΘI, ΘCT
I , and ΘABJ
I in a simple example with (ε1,ε 2)
iid ∼ N (0,1)
and Θ =[ −5,0]
2 . In the ﬁgure, ΘABJ
I is given by the union of the yellow, red, and black areas, and
ΘCT
I by the union of the red and black areas. ΘI i st h eb l a c kr e g i o n .I nS e c t i o n5w ee x p l a i nh o w
this region is calculated. The data is generated with θ 
1 = −1.15,θ  
2 = −1.4, and using a selection
mechanism which picks each of outcome (0,0) and (1,1) for 10% of ω : ε(ω) ∈ [0,−θ 
1] × [0,−θ 
2],
and each of outcome (1,0) and (0,1) for 40% of ω : ε(ω) ∈ [0,−θ 
1]×[0,−θ 
2]. Hence, the observed
distribution is P(y)=[ 0 .26572 0.34315 0.36531 0.02582]. Our results clearly show that ΘI is
substantially smaller than ΘCT
I and ΘABJ
I : the sharp identiﬁcation region has an area which is
43.5% of ΘABJ
I , and 52% of ΘCT
I .
4 Pure Strategies Only: A Further Simpliﬁcation
4.1 The Random Set of Equilibrium Outcomes Generated by Pure Strategies
We now assume that players in each market do not randomize across their actions. In this case, the
set Sθ takes its realizations in the vertices of ∆(A). For a given realization of x and ε, a strategy
16proﬁle a ∈ A is a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium if
(4.1) πj (aj,a −j,x j,ε j,θ) ≥ πj (˜ aj,a −j,x j,ε j,θ) ∀˜ aj ∈ Aj ∀j.
Using this inequality, we deﬁne the following θ-dependent set:
(4.2)
Yθ (x,ε)={y ∈ Y : ∃ a ∈ A s.t. y = a, πj (aj,a −j,x j,ε j,θ) ≥ πj (˜ aj,a −j,x j,ε j,θ) ∀˜ aj ∈ Aj ∀j}.
For a given value of θ, this is the set of outcomes generated by pure strategies Nash equilibria.12 As
we did for Sθ, we omit the explicit reference to this set’s dependence on x and ε. Given Assumption
1, one can easily show that Yθ is a random closed set in Y (see Deﬁnition 2). Because the realizations
of Yθ are subsets of the ﬁnite set Y, it suﬃces that π (·) is a measurable (rather than continuous)
function of x and ε in order to establish that Yθ is a random closed set in Y.
For the model to be correctly speciﬁed, it is necessary that at least for some parameter values
a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists P − a.s. Hence, we impose the following assumption:
Assumption 4 For a subset of values of θ ∈ Θ which include the values of θ that have generated
the observed outcomes y, a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists P − a.s.
Under Assumptions 1-4, the observed outcomes y are consistent with Nash behavior if and only
if there exists at least one θ ∈ Θ such that y(ω) ∈ Yθ (ω) P − a.s. (i.e., y is a selection of Yθ, see
Deﬁnition 3). In what follows, we exploit this insight to provide an equivalent characterization of
the identiﬁcation region in equation (3.8) based on a ﬁnite number of moment inequalities which
have to hold for x−a.s. Mathematically, this simpliﬁcation is due to the fact that when only pure
strategies are played, E(Q(Sθ)|x) is a closed convex polytope, fully characterized by a ﬁnite number
of supporting hyperplanes. The vertices of Q(Sθ) are determined by the selections of Sθ, which
in turn are degenerate mixed strategy proﬁles placing probability one on a speciﬁc action for each
player. Hence, the supporting hyperplanes determining E(Q(Sθ)|x) c a nb ee a s i l yo b t a i n e d( s e e
Theorem 4.1 below). On the other hand, when players randomize across their actions, in equilibrium
they must be indiﬀerent among the actions over which they place positive probability. This implies
that the equilibrium mixed strategy proﬁles are a function of both θ and ε.I f ε has a discrete
12Restrict the set Sθ to be a set of pure strategy Nash equilibria. Then under Assumption 2, Yθ coincides with Sθ.
However, under the more general Assumption 1-(iii), these two sets diﬀer, and
Yθ (x,ε)={y ∈ Y : ∃ a ∈ A s.t. y = g(a),π j (aj,a −j,x j,ε j,θ) ≥ πj (˜ aj,a −j,x j,ε j,θ) ∀˜ aj ∈ Aj ∀j}.
17distribution, E(Q(Sθ)|x) remains a convex polytope, and one can exactly calculate its supporting
hyperplanes. But when the distribution of ε is continuous, E(Q(Sθ)|x) may have inﬁnitely many
extreme points, and therefore one needs an inﬁnite number of inequalities to determine whether
P(y|x) belongs to it.
For the case that there are no covariates x, one can determine whether a random vector y is
a selection of an almost surely non-empty random closed set Yθ by using the results of Artstein
(1983), Norberg (1992) and Molchanov (2005, Theorem 1.2.20 and Section 1.4.8). These results
establish that y ∈ Sel(Yθ) i fa n do n l yi f 13
(4.3) P{y ∈ K} ≤ P{Yθ ∩ K 6= ∅} for all compact sets K ⊂ Y.
Because Y is ﬁnite, all subsets of Y are compact. The functional P{Yθ ∩K 6= ∅} on the right-hand
side of (4.3) is called the capacity functional of Yθ. The following deﬁnitions formally introduce
this functional and a few related ones:
Deﬁnition 4 Let Z be a random closed set in the topological space F, and denote by K the family
of compact subsets of F.
1. Af u n c t i o n a lTZ : K → [0,1] given by
TZ (K)=P{Z ∩ K 6= ∅},K∈ K
is said to be the capacity functional of Z.
2. Af u n c t i o n a lCZ : K → [0,1] given by
CZ (K)=P{Z ⊂ K},K∈ K
is said to be the containment functional of Z.
3. Af u n c t i o n a lIZ : K → [0,1] given by
IZ (K)=P{K ⊂ Z},K∈ K
is said to be the inclusion functional of Z.
The following relationships hold:
CZ (K)=1 − TZ (Kc), (4.4)
IZ (K)=1 − TZc (K).
13Beresteanu and Molinari (2008, Proposition 4.1) use this result to establish sharpness of the identiﬁcation region
of the parameters of a best linear predictor with interval outcome data. Galichon and Henry (2006) use it to deﬁne a
correctly speciﬁed partially identiﬁed structural model, and derive a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for Choquet capacities.
18where Kc and Zc denote, respectively, the complement of the sets K and Z.
Example 2 Consider a simple two player entry game similar to the one in Tamer (2003), omit the
covariates, assume that players’ payoﬀsa r eg i v e nb yπj = aj (a−jθj + εj), where aj ∈ {0,1} and
θj < 0,j=1 ,2, and assume that players only play pure strategy equilibria. Figure 2 plots the set Yθ
against the realizations of ε1,ε 2. In this case, TYθ ({(0,0)})=P(ε1 ≤ 0,ε 2 ≤ 0), TYθ ({(1,0)})=
P(ε1 ≥ 0,ε 2 ≤− θ2), TYθ ({(0,1)})=P(ε1 ≤− θ1,ε 2 ≥ 0), TYθ ({(1,1)})=P(ε1 ≥− θ1,ε 2 ≥− θ2),
TYθ ({(1,0),(0,1)})=TYθ ({(1,0)})+ TYθ ({(0,1)})− P(0 ≤ ε1 ≤− θ1,0 ≤ ε2 ≤− θ2). The ca-
pacity functional of the remaining subsets of Y can be calculated similarly. Corollary 5.1 and
Algorithm 5.1 show that the capacity functional of those remaining subsets can be obtained as sums
of the capacity functional of the subsets reported here. ¤
For the case that there are covariates x, the researcher observes the tuple (y,x), and the random
set Yθ is a function of x (and of course ε). Hence, one needs to work with the pair (Yθ,x). In this
case, the results of Artstein (1983), Norberg (1992) and Molchanov (2005, Theorem 1.2.20 and
Section 1.4.8) imply that (y,x) is a selection of (Yθ,x) i fa n do n l yi f
P{(y,x) ∈ K × L} ≤ P{(Yθ,x) ∩ K × L 6= ∅} ∀K ⊂ Y, ∀ compact sets L ⊂ X.
This inequality can be written as
P(y ∈ K|x ∈ L)P(x ∈ L) ≤ P{Yθ ∩ K 6= ∅|x ∈ L}P(x ∈ L) ∀K ⊂ Y, ∀ compact sets L ⊂ X,
and it is satisﬁe di fa n do n l yi f
(4.5) P(y ∈ K|x) ≤ P{Yθ ∩ K 6= ∅|x} ∀K ⊂ Y x − a.s.
Notice that given equation (4.4), inequalities (4.5) can be equivalently written as
(4.6) CYθ|x (K) ≤ P(y ∈ K|x) ≤ TYθ|x (K) ∀K ⊂ Y x − a.s.,
where the subscript Yθ|x denotes that the functional is for the random set Yθ conditional on x.
We return to this representation of inequalities (4.5) when discussing the relationship between our
analysis and that of CT. Clearly, if one considers all K ⊂ Y, the left-hand side inequality in (4.6)
is superﬂuous: when the inequalities in (4.6) are used, only subsets K ⊂ Y of cardinality up to half
of the cardinality of Y are needed.
We deﬁne the identiﬁed set of parameters θ as
(4.7) ΘI =
©
θ ∈ Θ : P(y ∈ K|x) ≤ TYθ|x (K) ∀K ⊂ Y x − a.s.
ª
.
19For comparison purposes, we reformulate the deﬁnition of the identiﬁe ds e t sg i v e nb yA B Ja n dC T










θ ∈ Θ : CYθ|x (t) ≤ P{y = t|x} ≤ TYθ|x (t) ∀t ∈ Y x − a.s.
ª
. (4.9)
Both ABJ and CT acknowledge that the identiﬁcation regions they give are not sharp. Comparing
the sets in equations (4.8)-(4.9) with the set in equation (4.7), one observes that ΘABJ
I is obtained
applying inequality (4.5) only for K = {y} ∀y ∈ Y. Similarly, ΘCT
I is obtained applying inequality
(4.6) only for K = {y} (or, equivalently, applying inequality (4.5) for K = {y} and K = Y\{y}
∀y ∈ Y). Clearly both ABJ and CT do not use the information contained in the remaining subsets
of Y, while this information is used to obtain ΘI. Two questions arise: (1) whether ΘI as deﬁned in
equation (4.7) coincides with ΘI as deﬁned in equation (3.8), hence yielding the sharp identiﬁcation
region of θ through a ﬁnite number of moment inequalities which need to hold for x−a.s.; and (2)
i fa n db yh o wm u c hΘI diﬀers from ΘABJ
I and ΘCT
I .
We answer here the ﬁrst question. Section 4.2 answers the second question by looking at a
simple example.
Theorem 4.1 Assume that players use only pure strategies, that Assumptions 1-3 are satisﬁed,
that θ is such that Assumption 4 is satisﬁed, and that no other information is available. Then for
x − a.s. these two conditions are equivalent:
1. u0P(y|x) ≤ E[h(Q(Sθ),u)|x] ∀ u ∈ S,
2. P(y ∈ K|x) ≤ TYθ|x (K) ∀K ⊂ Y.
Notice that a candidate value of θ ∈ Θ such that with positive probability a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium does not exist for a set of values of x of positive probability is trivially rejected as a
member of ΘI using either deﬁnitions of the identiﬁcation region in equations (3.8) and (4.7).
4.2 Example: Entry Game With 2 Types of Players and Pure Strategies Only
Consider a game where in each market there are four potential entrants, two of each type. The two
types diﬀer from each other by their payoﬀ function. This model is an extension of the seminal
papers by Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991). An empirical application of a version of this model
appears in Ciliberto and Tamer (2004). We adopt the version of this model described in Berry and
20Tamer (2007, pages 84-85), and for illustration purposes we simplify it by omitting the observable
payoﬀ shifters x and by setting to zero the constant in the payoﬀ function.
Let ajk ∈ {0,1} be the strategy of ﬁrm j =1 ,2 of type k =1 ,2. Entry is denoted by ajk =1 ,
with ajk =0denoting staying out. Let y1 = a11 + a21 denote the number of rivals of type 1 and
y2 = a12+a22 t h en u m b e ro fr i v a l so ft y p e2 that a ﬁrm faces so that yk ∈ {0,1,2}.P l a y e r sj =1 ,2
of type 1 and type 2 have respectively the following payoﬀ functions:
πj1 (aj1,a −j1,a 12,a 22,ε 1)=aj1 (θ11 (a−j1 + a12 + a22) − ε1), (4.10)
πj2 (aj2,a −j2,a 11,a 21,ε 2)=aj2 (θ21 (a11 + a21)+θ22a−j2 − ε2). (4.11)
We assume that θ11, θ21 and θ22 are strictly negative and that θ22 >θ 21. This means that a type 2
ﬁrm is worried more about rivals of type 1 than of rivals of its own type. Since ﬁrms of a given type
are indistinguishable to the econometrician, the observable outcome is the number of ﬁrms of each
type which enter the market. Hence there are 9 possible outcomes to this game: Y = {(0,0), (0,1),
(1,0), (1,1), (2,0), (0,2), (1,2), (2,1), (2,2)}. Figure 3 plots the set Yθ against the realizations
of ε1,ε 2.
We use this example to illustrate our methodology. We ﬁrst deﬁne the speciﬁcf o r mt a k e nb y





y ∈ Y : ∃ a ∈ A s.t.
y1 = a11 + a21,
y2 = a12 + a22,
aj1 (θ11 (a−j1 + y2) − ε1) ≥ (1 − aj1)(θ11 (a−j1 + y2) − ε1),j=1 ,2,




Because the set Y has cardinality 9, in principle there are 29 = 512 inequality restrictions to
consider, corresponding to each compact subset K ⊂ Y. However, the number of inequalities to be
checked is signiﬁcantly smaller. In particular, by a simple application of Algorithm 5.1 below, the
sharp identiﬁcation region that we give is based on 26 inequalities, whereas the identiﬁcation region
obtained following CT’s insight is based on 18 inequalities. Section 5 below addresses formally the
issue of how to reduce the number of inequalities to be checked.
Figure 7 and Table 2 report ΘI, ΘCT
I , and ΘABJ
I in a simple example with (ε1,ε 2)
iid ∼ N (0,1)
and Θ =[ −5,0]
3 . In the ﬁgure, ΘABJ
I is given by the union of the yellow, red and black segments,
and ΘCT
I by the union of the red and black segments. ΘI is the black segment. Notice that
the identiﬁcation regions are segments because the outcomes (0,0) and (2,2) c a no n l yo c c u ra s
unique equilibrium outcomes, and therefore imply two moment equalities which make θ21 and θ22
a function of θ11. While, strictly speaking, the approach in ABJ does not take into account this
21fact, as it uses only upper bounds on the probabilities that each outcome occurs, it is clear (and
indicated in their paper) that one can incorporate equalities into their method. Hence, we use
the equalities on P(y =( 0 ,0)) and P(y =( 2 ,2)) also when calculating ΘABJ
I . We generate the
data with θ 
11 = −0.15,θ  
21 = −0.20, and θ 
22 = −0.10 and use a selection mechanism to choose
the equilibrium played in the many regions of multiplicity. The resulting observed distribution is
P(y)=[ 0.3021 0.0335 0.0231 0.0019 0.2601 0.2779 0.0104 0.0158 0.0752]. Our results clearly show
that ΘI is substantially smaller than ΘCT
I and ΘABJ
I . The width of the bounds on each parameter
vector obtained using our method is about 46% of the width obtained using ABJ’s method, and
about 63% of the width obtained using CT’s method.
5 Computational Aspects of the Problem
In order to compute the sharp identiﬁcation region, we need to calculate the support function of the
random set Q(Sθ). This is achieved by applying the Method of Simulated Moments, see McFadden
(1989) and Pakes and Pollard (1989). The ﬁrst step in the procedure requires one to compute the
set of all mixed strategy Nash equilibria for given realizations of the payoﬀ shifters, Sθ (x,ε). This
is a computationally challenging problem, though a well studied one which can be performed using
the Gambit software described by McKelvey and McLennan (1996).14 Notice that this step has to
be performed regardless of which features of normal form games are identiﬁed: whether suﬃcient
conditions are imposed for point identiﬁcation of the parameter vector of interest, or this vector is
restricted to lie in an outer region, or its sharp identiﬁcation region is characterized through the
methodology proposed in this paper.
In our case, for given realizations of x and ε, computation of the set Sθ (x,ε) is needed in order















One can simulate this integral using the following procedure.15 For any x ∈ X, draw realizations of
ε, denoted εb,b=1 ,...,B,according to the distribution F (·|x) with identity covariance matrix.
These draws stay ﬁxed throughout the remaining steps. Transform the realizations εb,b=1 ,...,B,
14The Gambit software can be freely downloaded at http://gambit.sourceforge.net/. Bajari, Hong, and Ryan (2007)
use this software to compute the set of mixed strategy Nash equilibria in ﬁnite normal form games whose parameters
are point identiﬁed.
15The procedure described here is very similar to the one proposed by Ciliberto and Tamer (2004). When the
assumptions maintained by Bajari, Hong, and Ryan (2007, Section 3) are satisﬁed, their algorithm can be used to
signiﬁcantly reduce the computational burden associated with simulating the integral.





for j =1 ,...,J and obtain the set Sθ
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x,ε b¢





. Pick a u ∈ S∆,











, and average it over a large number of draws
of εb.
The same reasoning gives that the conditional Aumann expectation E(Q(Sθ)|x) can be ap-














The strong law of large numbers in Molchanov (2005, Theorem 3.1.6) guarantees that as B →∞ ,




→ 0 P − a.s. This in















uniformly in u ∈ S∆, see Schneider (1993, Theorem 1.8.12).




P(y|x), b EB (Q(Sθ)|x)
´
dFx the analog of W(θ) from equation
(3.9), with b EB (Q(Sθ)|x) replacing E(Q(Sθ)|x), we have that by triangle inequality
sup
θ∈Θ















where the last inequality follows by the properties of the conditional Aumann expectation, Molchanov







bution to the supremum of a Gaussian process (Molchanov (2005, Theorem 2.2.1)). Hence, the
arguments in Manski and Tamer (2002, Proposition 5), Ciliberto and Tamer (2004), and Cher-
nozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2007) assure that an identiﬁcation region based on the simulated
conditional Aumann expectation and its support function delivers an approximation of ΘI which
converges to ΘI with respect to the Hausdorﬀ metric as B →∞ . In what follows we do not
diﬀerentiate between the set ΘI, and its counterpart resulting from numerical simulations.
5.1 Computing the Identiﬁcation Region in the Pure Strategies Case
When it is assumed that players play only pure strategies, one needs to calculate the capacity
functional of the random set Yθ. As established in Theorem 4.1, TYθ|x (K),K⊂ Y, is equal to the
expectation of the support function of the set Q(Sθ) evaluated at u e q u a lt oe a c ho ft h e2κY vectors
with each entry equal to either 1 or 0. Hence TYθ|x (K),K⊂ Y, can be approximated through the
procedure described above.
23The set ΘI is deﬁned by 2κY inequalities which have to hold for x − a.s. This number can be,
in practice, very large. However, we emphasize that once the set Yθ has been computed, evaluating
whether all 2κY inequalities are satisﬁed is a matter of “bookkeeping.” Nevertheless, it can be a
demanding task when the number of players or the number of actions each player can take is large.
Fortunately, in many cases there is no need to verify the complete set of 2κY inequalities, because
many are redundant.16 In particular, if K1 and K2 are two disjoint subsets of Y such that
(5.1) {ω : Yθ (ω) ∩ K1 6= ∅|x} ∩ {ω : Yθ (ω) ∩ K2 6= ∅|x} = ∅,
that is, the set of ω for which Yθ intersects both K1 and K2 has probability zero, then the
inequality P{y ∈ K1 ∪ K2|x} ≤ P{Yθ ∩ (K1 ∪ K2) 6= ∅|x} does not add any information be-
yond that provided by the inequalities P{y ∈ K1|x} ≤ P{Yθ ∩ K1 6= ∅|x} and P{y ∈ K2|x} ≤
P{Yθ ∩ K2 6= ∅|x}. Therefore, prior knowledge of some properties of the game can be very helpful
in eliminating unnecessary inequalities. For example, in a Bresnahan and Reiss entry model with
4 players, if the number of entrants is identiﬁed, the number of inequalities to be veriﬁed reduces
from 65,536 to at most 100. Theorem 5.1 below gives the general result. While its proof is simple,
this result is conceptually and practically important.
Theorem 5.1 Take θ ∈ Θ and let Assumptions 1-4 hold. Consider a partition of Ω into sets
Ω1,...,ΩM of positive probability. Let Yi
Yi = ∪{Yθ(ω): ω ∈ Ωi}.
denote the range of Yθ(ω) for ω ∈ Ωi. Assume that Y1,...,YM are disjoint. Then it suﬃces to
check (4.5) only for all subsets K such that there is i =1 ,...,M for which K ⊆ Yi.
A simple Corollary of Theorem 5.1, the proof of which is omitted, is the following:
Corollary 5.1 Take θ ∈ Θ and let Assumptions 1-4 hold. Assume that Ω = Ω1∪Ω2 with Ω1∩Ω2 =
∅, such that Yθ(ω) is a singleton almost surely for ω ∈ Ω1. Let Yi = ∪ω∈ΩiYθ(ω),i=1 ,2, and assume
that Y1 ∩ Y2 = ∅ and that κY2 ≤ 2. Then inequalities (4.5) hold if
(5.2) P{Yθ = {t}|x} ≤ P{y = t|x} ≤ P{t ∈ Yθ|x}
x − a.s. for all t ∈ Y.
16The game we described in Section 4.2 above is an example for the possible elimination of redundant inequalities.
24An implication of this Corollary is that in a static entry game with two players in which only
pure strategies are played, the identiﬁcation region proposed by CT coincides with ours, and is
sharp.17 In this example, Y1 = {(0,0),(1,1)}, Y2 = {(0,1),(1,0)}, and Ω2 = {ω : Yθ ∩ Y2 6= ∅}.
An application of Algorithm 5.1 below shows that actually the sharp identiﬁcation region can be
obtained by checking only ﬁve inequalities which have to hold for x − a.s., given by inequalities
(4.5) for K = {(0,0)}, {(1,0)}, {(0,1)}, {(1,1)}, {(1,0),(0,1)}. On the other hand, the example
in Section 3.3 above shows that CT’s approach does not yield the sharp identiﬁcation region when
mixed strategies are allowed for.
When no prior knowledge of the game such as, for example, that required in Theorem 5.1 is
available, it is still possible to use the insight in equation (5.1) within an algorithm that determines
which inequalities yield the sharp identiﬁcation region. In particular, one can use the following
procedure to build a collection of sets C such that checking inequalities (4.5) for each element of
C suﬃces for sharpness. That is, the algorithm decomposes Y into subsets such that Yθ does not
jointly hit any two of them with positive probability. Observe that
P{Yθ ∩ K1 6= ∅,Y θ ∩ K2 6= ∅|x} =
Z
1(Yθ (x,ε) ∩ K1 6= ∅)1(Yθ (x,ε) ∩ K2 6= ∅)dF (ε|x),
so that this probability can be easily approximated by simulation for any K1,K 2 ⊂ Y as described
above. Hence, one can use the following algorithm to determine which inequalities to check.
Algorithm 5.1
0) Set C1 = Y and C2 = ∅.







Yθ ∩ ti 6= ∅,Y θ ∩ tj 6= ∅
¯ ¯x
ª
> 0 ∀x ∈ ˜ Xij
let C2 = C2 ∪
©
ti,t jª



















> 0 ∀x ∈ ˜ Xijk,
let C3 = C3 ∪
©
ti,t j,t kª
. If for all
©
ti,t jª
∈ C2, for each tk ∈ C1,k6= i,j, the above condition is not
satisﬁed, let ¯ m =2and stop. Else, let ¯ m =3 , set C ¯ m = ∅, a n dg ot ot h en e x ts t e p .
17A literal application of ABJ’s approach does not take into account the fact that in this game (0,0) and (1,1) only
occur as unique equilibria of the game, and therefore does not yield the sharp identiﬁcation region as ABJ discuss
(see page 32)














6= ∅,Y θ ∩ tk 6= ∅
¯ ¯ ¯x
o
> 0 ∀x ∈ ˜ Xi1,...,im−1,
let Cm = Cm ∪
©
ti1,...,t im−1,t kª
. If for all
©
ti1,...,t im−1ª
∈ Cm−1, for each tk ∈ C1,k 6=
i1,...,i m−1, the above condition is not satisﬁed, let ¯ m = m − 1 and stop. Else, let ¯ m = m,
set C ¯ m = ∅, and continue.
The set ΘI is then given by equation (4.7) for K ∈
S¯ m
m=1 Cm.
One may wonder whether in general the above algorithm will yield a diﬀerent set of inequalities
compared to those used by ABJ or CT. The following result shows that in general the system of
constraints (4.5) obtained by restricting attention to K being singletons, as it is done by ABJ,
does not yield a full characterization of the random set Yθ, and therefore is not suited to yield
the sharp identiﬁcation region. Hence, Algorithm 5.1 returns a diﬀerent set of inequalities to be
checked compared to ABJ when the assumptions of Theorem 5.2 are satisﬁed.
Theorem 5.2 Let Assumptions 1-4 hold. Assume that there exists θ ∈ Θ, with Yθ 6= ∅ P − a.s.,




> 0, the expected cardinality of Yθ given x is strictly
greater than one, and such that P
©©
t1,t 2ª
∩ Yθ 6= ∅
¯ ¯x
ª
< 1 for all t1,t 2 ∈ Y. Then there exists a
random vector z which satisﬁes inequalities (4.5) for K = {t} ∀t ∈ Y but is not a selection of Yθ.
This result shows that the extra inequalities matter in general, compared to those used by ABJ,
to fully characterize Yθ and determine if y ∈ Sel(Yθ). In fact, the assumptions of the theorem are
satisﬁed whenever the model has multiple equilibria with positive probability, which implies that
the expected cardinality of Yθ given x is strictly greater than one, and it has at least three diﬀerent
equilibria.
On the other hand, CT strengthen the use of the singleton-based inequalities through an insight
that corresponds to the observation that
(5.3) P{Yθ = {t}|x} = CYθ|x ({t}) ≤ P{y = t|x} ≤ P{t ∈ Yθ|x} = TYθ|x({t}) ∀t ∈ Y x − a.s.
For simplicity write I(t) instead of I({t}), and I(t1,t 2) instead of I({t1,t 2}) and the same for the
capacity functional T and the containment functional C. The following result shows that under
certain assumptions the system of constraints (4.6) obtained by restricting attention to K being
singletons, as it is done by CT, does not yield a full characterization of the random set Yθ, and
26therefore is not suited to yield the sharp identiﬁcation region. Hence when the assumptions of
Theorem 5.3 are satisﬁed, Algorithm 5.1 returns a diﬀerent set of inequalities to be checked than
those used by CT.
Theorem 5.3 Let Assumptions 1-4 hold. Assume that there exists θ ∈ Θ, with Yθ 6= ∅ P − a.s.,




> 0,t h e r ee x i s tt1,t 2 ∈ Y with
(5.4) IYθ|x(t1,t 2) > 0
and
(5.5) P{κYθ > 1|x} > IYθ|x(t1)+IYθ|x(t2) − CYθ|x(t1) − CYθ|x(t2).
Then there exists a random vector z which satisﬁes inequalities (5.3) but is not a selection of Yθ.
This result shows that the extra inequalities matter in general, compared to those used by CT,
to fully characterize Yθ and determine if y ∈ Sel(Yθ). In fact, the assumptions of the theorem
are satisﬁed whenever (1) there are regions of the unobservables of positive probability where two
diﬀerent outcomes can result from equilibrium strategy proﬁles; and (2) the probability that the
cardinality of Yθ is greater than one exceeds the probability that each of these two outcomes is
not a unique equilibrium. It is easy to see that these assumptions are not satisﬁed in a two player
entry game where players are allowed only to play pure strategies, but they are satisﬁed in the four
player, two type game described in Section 4.2.
5.2 Computing the Identiﬁcation Region in the Mixed Strategies Case
Consider now the case where players randomize across their actions. The support function of the
conditional Aumann expectation E(Q(Sθ)|x) can be approximated by simulation as described at
the beginning of Section 5. We now discuss how to discretize the unit sphere S∆ in order to
transform the deﬁnition of ΘI based on the support function in equation (3.8) into a deﬁnition
involving a ﬁnite number of moment inequalities which have to hold for x − a.s.
Our proposal is to use a νk-net on the sphere. For a given 0 <ν k < 1, a νk-net of S∆ is given
by a ﬁnite subset of vectors Uk = {u1,...,u k} ⊂ S∆ such that for every vector u ∈ S∆ there is an
i ∈ {1,...,k} with the property that u is within distance νk from ui. By construction,











Gardner and Milanfar (2003, Lemma 7.1). An easy to implement algorithm which allows one to
build such a νk-net is provided in Lovisolo and DaSilva (2001, Section 2). This is the algorithm
used for the construction of the νk-net used in the examples in Sections 3.3 and 6.2. In those
examples, we approximate ΘI using 1,160 points uniformly distributed over the unit sphere.18 This
corresponds to a value of νk equal to 0.222.
Once the νk-net is constructed, one can deﬁne the set
(5.6) ΘIUk =
©
θ ∈ Θ : u0P(y|x) ≤ E[h(Q(Sθ),u)|x] ∀ u ∈ Uk x − a.s.
ª
.
Then by construction ΘI ⊂ ΘIUk. As νk → 0, ΘIUk decreases to ΘI, a result formally established
in the following Theorem.
Theorem 5.4 Let ΘI and ΘIUk be deﬁned by equations (3.8) and (5.6) respectively. Let UK be a
νk-net of S∆, with νk → 0 as k →∞ . Then ρH (ΘI,ΘIUk) → 0 as k →∞ .
6 Extensions to Other Solution Concepts
While in the main body of this paper we focus on economic models of games in which Nash Equi-
librium is the solution concept employed, our approach easily extends to other solution concepts.
Here we consider the case that players are assumed to be only level-1 rational, and the case that
they are assumed to play correlated strategies. For simplicity, we exemplify these extensions using
a two player simultaneous move static game of entry with complete information.
6.1 Level-1 Rationality
Suppose that players are only assumed to be level-1 rational. The identiﬁcation problem under this
weaker solution concept was ﬁrst studied by Aradillas-Lopez and Tamer (2008, AT henceforth). Let
the econometrician observe players’ actions, so that Assumption 2 is satisﬁed. A level-1 rational
proﬁle is given by a mixed strategy for each player that is a best response to one of the possible
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πj (σj, ˜ σ−j,x j,ε j,θ) ≥ πj
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18We experimented with a signiﬁcantly larger number of points, but this did not appreciably change the approxi-
mation of ΘI.
28Omitting the explicit reference to its dependence on x and ε, Rθ is the set of level-1 rational strategy
proﬁles of the game. By similar arguments to what we used above, this is a random closed set in
∆(A). Figure 4 plots this set against the possible realizations of ε1,ε 2, in a simple two player
simultaneous move, complete information, static game of entry. We ignore covariates for ease of
exposition, and assume that players’ payoﬀsa r eg i v e nb yπj = aj (a−jθj + εj), where aj ∈ {0,1}
and θj is assumed to be negative (monopoly payoﬀs are higher than duopoly payoﬀs), j =1 ,2.
The same approach of Section 3 allows us to obtain the sharp identiﬁcation region for θ as
ΘI =
©




q(Rθ)={([q(σ)]k ,k=1 ,...,κ Y):σ ∈ Sel(Rθ)},
where [q(σ)]k ,k=1 ,...,κ Y, is deﬁned in equation (3.3).











∈ co[{[q(0,0)]k ,[q(1,0)]k ,[q(0,1)]k ,[q(1,1)]k}],







, with ˜ Rθ restricted to be the
set of level-1 rational pure strategies. Hence, by Theorem 4.1, ΘI can be obtained by checking a
ﬁnite number of moment inequalities.
For the case that ε has a discrete distribution, AT (Section 3.1) suggest to obtain the sharp
identiﬁcation region as the set of parameter values that return value zero for the objective function of
a linear programming problem. For the general case in which ε may have a continuous distribution,
AT apply the same insight of CT and characterize an outer identiﬁcation region through eight
moment inequalities as in equation (4.9). One may also extend ABJ’s approach to this problem,
and obtain a larger outer region through four moment inequalities as in equation (4.8). Our
approach, which yields the sharp identiﬁcation region, in this simple example requires one to check
14 inequalities.
As shown in AT (Figure 3), the model with level-1 rationality only places upper bounds on θ1,θ2.
Figure 8 plots the upper contours of ΘI, ΘCT
I , and ΘABJ
I in a simple example with (ε1,ε 2)
iid ∼ N (0,1)
and Θ =[ −5,0]
2 . The data is generated with θ 
1 = −1.15,θ  
2 = −1.4, and using a selection
mechanism which picks outcome (0,0) for 40% of ω : ε(ω) ∈ [0,−θ 
1] × [0,−θ 
2], outcome (1,1) for
10% of ω : ε(ω) ∈ [0,−θ 
1] × [0,−θ 
2], and each of outcome (1,0) and (0,1) for 25% of ω : ε(ω) ∈
[0,−θ 
1] × [0,−θ 
2]. Hence, the observed distribution is P(y)=[ 0 .5048 0.2218 0.1996 0.0738].O u r
29methodology allows us to obtain signiﬁcantly lower upper contours compared to AT (and CT)
and ABJ. The upper bounds on θ1,θ2 resulting from the projections of ΘABJ
I , ΘCT
I and ΘI are,
respectively, (−0.02,−0.02,), (−0.15,−0.26), and (−0.54,−0.61).
6.2 Objective Correlated Equilibria
Suppose that players play correlated equilibria, a notion introduced by Aumann (1974). A corre-
lated equilibrium can be interpreted as the distribution of play instructions given by some “trusted
authority” to the players. Each player is given her instruction privately but does not know the
instruction received by others. The distribution of instructions is common knowledge across all
players. Then a correlated joint strategy γ ∈ ∆κA−1, where ∆κA−1 denotes the set of probability
distribution on A, is an equilibrium if, conditional on knowing that her own instruction is to play
aj, each player j has no incentive to deviate to any other strategy a0
j, assuming that the other
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Omitting the explicit reference to its dependence on x and ε, Cθ is the set of correlated equilibrium
strategies of the game. By similar arguments as those used before, it is a random closed set in
∆κA−1. Notice that Cθ is deﬁn e db yaﬁnite number of linear inequalities on the set ∆κA−1 of
correlated strategies, and therefore it is a non-empty polytope. Yang (2008) is the ﬁrst to use this
fact, along with the fact that co[Q(Sθ)] ⊂ Cθ, to develop a computationally easy-to-implement
estimator for an outer identiﬁcation region of θ, when the solution concept employed is Nash
equilibrium. Here we provide a simple characterization of the sharp identiﬁcation region ΘI, when
the solution concept employed is objective correlated equilibrium. In particular, the same approach
of Section 3 allows us to obtain the sharp identiﬁcation region for θ as
ΘI =
©
θ ∈ Θ : u0P(y|x) ≤ E[h(Cθ,u)|x] ∀ u ∈ S∆ x − a.s.
ª
.
In our simple two player simultaneous move, complete information, static game of entry, Aj =
{0,1},j=1 ,2, A = {(0,0),(1,0),(0,1),(1,1)}. We ignore covariates for ease of exposition, and
assume that players’ payoﬀsa r eg i v e nb yπj = aj (a−jθj + εj), where aj ∈ {0,1} and θj is assumed
to be negative (monopoly payoﬀs are higher than duopoly payoﬀs), j =1 ,2. Figure 5 plots the
set Cθ against the possible realizations of ε1,ε 2, for this example. Notice that for ω ∈ Ω1 such
that ε(ω) / ∈ [0,−θ1] × [0,−θ2], the game is dominance solvable and therefore Cθ (ω) is given by
30the singleton Q(Sθ (ω)) resulting from the unique Nash equilibrium in those regions. For ω ∈ Ω1
such that ε(ω) ∈ [0,−θ1]×[0,−θ2],C θ (ω) is given by a polytope with ﬁve vertices, three of which
are implied by Nash equilibria, see Calvó-Armengol (2006).19 Also in this case one can extend the
approaches of ABJ and CT to obtain outer identiﬁcation regions deﬁned, respectively, by four and
eight moment inequalities as in equations (4.8)-(4.9).
Figure 9 and Table 3 report ΘI, ΘCT
I , and ΘABJ
I in a simple example with (ε1,ε 2)
iid ∼ N (0,1)
and Θ =[ −5,0]
2 . In the ﬁgure, ΘABJ
I is given by the union of the yellow, red and black areas, and
ΘCT
I by the union of the red and black areas. ΘI is the black region. The data is generated with
θ 
1 = −1.15,θ  
2 = −1.4, and using a selection mechanism which picks each of outcome (0,0) and (1,1)
for 10% of ω : ε(ω) ∈ [0,−θ 
1]×[0,−θ 
2], and each of outcome (1,0) and (0,1) for 40% of ω : ε(ω) ∈
[0,−θ 
1] × [0,−θ 
2]. Hence, the observed distribution is P(y)=[ 0 .26572 0.34315 0.36531 0.02582].
Also in this case ΘI is smaller than ΘCT
I and ΘABJ
I , although the reduction in the size of the
identiﬁcation region is less pronounced than in the ca s ew h e r em i x e ds t r a t e g yN a s he q u i l i b r i u mi s
the solution concept.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper introduces a computationally feasible characterization of the sharp identiﬁcation region
of the model parameters in static, simultaneous move ﬁnite games of complete information in
the presence of multiple equilibria. The methodology that we propose allows us to bypass the
need to directly deal with inﬁnite dimensional nuisance parameters, the selection mechanisms, a
simpliﬁcation that was considered unattainable in the related literature (see, e.g., Berry and Tamer
(2007)).
For the case that players are assumed to play only pure strategies, we show that the sharp
identiﬁcation region is given by a ﬁnite number of moment inequalities which have to hold for x−a.s.
While ﬁnite, this number of moment inequalities can be very large in certain games. However, we
19These vertices are



































































γ4 (ω)=[ 0 ,1,0,0]
31show that many such inequalities may be redundant, and we provide a simple algorithm that
allows the researcher to determine a (often signiﬁcantly) smaller set of moment inequalities that
are suﬃcient to preserve sharpness.
When players may also randomize across their actions, the sharp identiﬁcation region cannot
in general be characterized through a ﬁnite number of moment inequalities. Intuitively, this is
because there is additional information provided by the fact that players must be indiﬀerent among
the actions that they play with positive probability according to a given equilibrium strategy. While
there is an inﬁnite number of inequalities characterizing the sharp identiﬁcation region, we show
that this region can be approximated arbitrarily accurately through a ﬁnite number of moment
inequalities, which again have to hold for x−a.s. As this number of moment inequalities increases,
the approximated identiﬁcation region converges to the sharp identiﬁcation region with respect to
the Hausdorﬀ metric.
We acknowledge that the method proposed in this paper may be, for some models, compu-
tationally more intensive than existing methods (e.g., Andrews, Berry, and Jia (2004), Ciliberto
and Tamer (2004)). However, the beneﬁts in terms of identiﬁcation coming from considering these
additional inequalities may be substantial, as illustrated by our examples.
32AP r o o f s
Theorem 3.1.
Proof. In order to establish sharpness, it suﬃces to show that ΘI = Θ 
I. Take θ ∈ ΘI.
Then ∃ q ∈ Sel(Q(Sθ)) : E(q|x)=P(y|x). Hence a selection mechanism that selects with
probability 1 a σ ∈ Sel(Sθ):q=([q(σ)]k ,k=1 ,...,κ Y) is admissible and assures that θ ∈ Θ 
I
(notice that by the deﬁnition of Q(Sθ), such a σ ∈ Sel(Sθ) exists). Conversely, take θ ∈ Θ 
I. Then
there exists an admissible selection mechanism ψ which picks a selection σ ∈ Sel(Sθ), such that
P(y|x)=P(y|x;θ,ψ)=E(q|x) for x − a.s. for q=([q(σ)]k ,k=1 ,...,κ Y). Hence θ ∈ ΘI.
Theorem 4.1.
Proof. Let condition (1) hold. Notice that because the support function is positively ho-
mogeneous, this condition is equivalent to u0P(y|x) ≤ E[h(Q(Sθ),u)|x] ∀ u ∈ <κY.T a k e a n y
¯ u ∈ <κY such that its entries are zeros and ones. The coordinates of ¯ u correspond to the vertices of
∆(A1)×...×∆(AJ), and determine a subset K¯ u of Y. By deﬁnition, the scalar product ¯ u0P(y|x)
equals P(y ∈ K¯ u|x).M o r e o v e r ,










Because we are allowing only pure strategy equilibria, the realizations of any σ ∈ Sθ are vectors







=1 , and zero otherwise.
Thus, given the choice of ¯ u, the value of ¯ u0q(σ(ω1)) equals one if y(ω1) ∈ K¯ u and zero otherwise.
Hence, condition (1) reduces to





¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
x
#
= E[1(Yθ ∩ K¯ u 6= ∅)|x]=P{Yθ ∩ K¯ u 6= ∅|x}.
Choosing ¯ u equal to each of the 2κY vectors with entries equal to either 1 or 0, yields condition (2).
Suppose now that condition (2) holds. Then y ∈ Sel(Yθ). This means that ∃ σ ∈ Sel(Sθ):
σj (ω1,a j)=1if yj (ω1)=aj and zero otherwise. Hence, P(y|x) ∈ E(Q(Sθ)|x) for x − a.s., and
therefore condition (1) is satisﬁed.
Theorem 5.1.
Proof. If Ki = K ∩ Yi for i =1 ,...,M,t h e n
P{y ∈ K|x} =
M P
i=1
P{y ∈ Ki|x} ≤
M P
i=1
P{Yθ ∩ Ki 6= ∅|x} = P{Yθ ∩ K 6= ∅|x},x − a.s.,
33since Yθ cannot hit both Ki and Kj simultaneously in view of the disjointedness assumption.
Theorem 5.2.
Proof. To simplify the notation, we omit the conditioning on x ∈ ˜ X and the subscript Yθ|x
indexing the inclusion functional in all that follows. For each ﬁnite set K = {t1,...,t k} ⊂ Y write
I(t1,...,t k)=P{K ⊂ Yθ} for the inclusion functional of K. Since the expected cardinality of Yθ is
more than one, there exist t1,t 2 ∈ Y such that I(t1,t 2) > 0.
Assume that I(t1)+I(t2) ≥ 1. Then choose a random element z which takes values t1 and t2
with probabilities that sum to one and are dominated by I(t1) and I(t2) respectively. Then (4.5)
holds for all singletons K, while if K =
©
t1,t 2ª















, since the latter is less than one by assumption.
Assume that I(t1)+I(t2) < 1. Then construct a random element z that takes values t1 and t2




by I(t) for the chosen t, such that
P
t∈Y
P{z = t} =1 . This is possible, since the total sum of I(t)





















Proof. To simplify the notation, we omit the conditioning on x ∈ ˜ X and the subscript Yθ|x
indexing the containment, inclusion, and capacity functionals in all that follows. We use notation









Note that the expected cardinality E(κYθ) is greater than one, since the random set Yθ is almost
surely non-empty and has cardinality at least two with positive probability.
34Take t1,t 2 to satisfy the assumptions of Theorem 5.3. If I(t1)+I(t2) ≥ 1,t h e nd e ﬁne z which
takes values t 6= t1,t 2 with probabilities C(t). Furthermore, assume that z takes values t1 and
t2 with the probabilities pt1 = C(t1)+δt1 and pt2 = C(t2)+δt2 dominated by I(t1) and I(t2)
respectively, with δt1,δt2 two non-negative constants for which
P
t∈Y
C(t)+δt1 + δt2 =1 .
Such constants δt1,δt2 exist, because the left-hand side in the above expression is less than 1 for
δt1 = δt2 =0since κYθ > 1 with positive probability, and the left-hand side is greater than or equal
t o1f o rδt1 = I(t1)−C(t1) and δt2 = I(t2)−C(t2). This together with equation (A.1) implies that
P{κYθ =1 } + δt1 + δt2 =1 , whence
pt1 + pt2 = C(t1)+C(t2)+δt1 + δt2 = C(t1)+C(t2)+P{κYθ > 1}.








, where the inequality follows by equation (5.4). Thus, P{z ∈ K}
is not dominated by T(K) for K = {t1,t 2},i . e .z is not a selection of Yθ.
Consider now the case that I(t1)+I(t2) < 1. Then construct a random element z that takes
values t1 and t2 with probabilities pt1 = I(t1) and pt2 = I(t2) and some values t outside of {t1,t 2}
with probabilities pt = λI(t)+( 1− λ)C(t) for some λ ∈ [0,1].O n ec a nﬁnd values of λ such that











C(t)+I(t1)−C(t1)+I(t2)−C(t2)=1−(P{κYθ > 1}−I(t1)−I(t2)+C(t1)+C(t2)) < 1
by (5.5). Finally,
P{z ∈ {t1,t 2}} = pt1 + pt2 = I(t1)+I(t2)
while (5.4) yields that
T(t1,t 2)=P{{t1,t 2} ∩ Yθ 6= ∅} = I(t1)+I(t2) − I(t1,t 2) < I(t1)+I(t2).
Thus, P{z ∈ K} is not dominated by T(K) for K = {t1,t 2}, i.e. in this case it is also possible to
construct a random element that satisﬁes (5.3), but fails to satisfy (4.5).
Theorem 5.4.
Proof. Observe that {ΘIUk}k∈N , is a decreasing sequence in the set of non-empty compact







θ ∈ Θ : u0P(y|x) ≤ E[h(Q(Sθ),u)|x] ∀ u ∈ Uk x − a.s.
ª
= ΘI.
35Hence, ρH (ΘI,ΘIUk) → 0, see, e.g., Schneider (1993, Lemma 1.8.1).
B Details for the Two Players Entry Game
Elements of the Aumann Expectation
For a given q ∈ Sel(Q(Sθ)), the values of the coordinates of E(q) are:
E[(1 − σ1)(1− σ2)] = P(ε1 ≤ 0,ε 2 ≤ 0)
+E
∙
(1 − σ1)(1− σ2)1
µ








E[σ1 (1 − σ2)] = P((ε1,ε 2) ∈ [−θ1,+∞) × (−∞,−θ2] ∪ [0,−θ1] × (−∞,0])
+P(0 ≤ ε1 ≤− θ1,0 ≤ ε2 ≤− θ2,σ1 =1 ,σ2 =0 )
+E
∙
σ1 (1 − σ2)1
µ








E[(1 − σ1)σ2]=P((ε1,ε 2) ∈ (−∞,0] × [0,+∞) ∪ [0,−θ1] × [−θ2,+∞))
























where 1(·) denotes the indicator function of the event in brackets.
Further Exempliﬁcation of the Sharpness Result
In order to further illustrate the sharpness result, we apply Berry and Tamer (2007) formulation
to this game. Let
Uθ
t = {ε : t is the unique equilibrium outcome given θ},
Mθ
D = {ε : D is the set of multiple equilibrium outcomes given θ},
where t ∈ Y is an equilibrium outcome, and D is the set {(0,1),(1,0),(σ1,σ2)},w i t h(0,1),(1,0)
being pure strategy equilibria, and (σ1,σ2) being a mixed strategy equilibrium. Notice that in
this case, Mθ
D = {ε : ε ∈ [0,−θ1] × [0,−θ2]}. If ω1 : ε(ω1) ∈ [0,−θ1] × [0,−θ2], let d be a random
variable denoting which of the possible equilibria is selected in the region of multiplicity, with d =1
if (1,0) is selected, d =2if (0,1) is selected, and d =3if the mixed strategy equilibrium is selected.
Let ψ (ε)=[ P(d = i|ε),i =1 ,2,3] denote an admissible equilibrium selection mechanism in the
region of multiplicity. As in Berry and Tamer, this equilibrium selection mechanism is left unspec-


















































































= P(ε1 ≤ 0,ε 2 ≤ 0) etc. Comparing these equations with the ones above deﬁning
E(q),q∈ Sel(Q(Sθ)), one observes that the expressions are identical. In fact, each selection
q ∈ Sel(Q(Sθ)) determines an admissible selection mechanism (observing that q ∈ Sel(Q(Sθ)) if
a n do n l yi f∃ σ ∈ Sel(Sθ) such that q = q(σ)), and each admissible selection mechanism determines
a selection σ ∈ Sel(Sθ).
ABJ and CT Inequalities as a Special Case of the Support Function Inequalities
Finally, we show that the inequalities deﬁning the set ΘCT
I in Section 3.3 (and therefore those
deﬁning the set ΘABJ
I ) are a subset of the inequalities deﬁning ΘI in equation (3.8). Using the
i n f o r m a t i o ni nF i g u r e1 ,w eh a v et h a tf o rω ∈ Ω1,
Q(Sθ (ω)) =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
©
[1 0 0 0]
0ª
if ε(ω) ∈ (−∞,0] × (−∞,0], ©
[0 1 0 0]
0ª
if ε(ω) ∈ [−θ1,+∞) × (−∞,−θ2] ∪ [0,−θ1] × (−∞,0], ©
[0 0 1 0]
0ª
if ε(ω) ∈ (−∞,0] × [0,+∞) ∪ [0,−θ1] × [−θ2,+∞), ©
[0 0 0 1]
0ª
if ε(ω) ∈ [−θ1,+∞) × [−θ2,+∞), ©©




[0 0 1 0]
0ªª




































⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
u1 if ε(ω) ∈ (−∞,0] × (−∞,0],
u2 if ε(ω) ∈ [−θ1,+∞) × (−∞,−θ2] ∪ [0,−θ1] × (−∞,0],
u3 if ε(ω) ∈ (−∞,0] × [0,+∞) ∪ [0,−θ1] × [−θ2,+∞),



























P(y =( 0 ,0)) ≤ E(h(Q(Sθ),u))






















−P(y =( 0 ,0)) ≤ E(h(Q(Sθ),u)) = −P(Sθ = {(0,0)}).
A similar argument applies to the remaining canonical basis vectors in <4, and to these vectors
multiplied by −1. This yields the desired result.
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41Table 1: Projections of ΘABJ
I , ΘCT
I and ΘI, reduction in bounds width (in parentheses), and area
of the identiﬁcation regions compared to ABJ. Two player entry game with mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium as solution concept.




θ1 −1.15 [−2.715,−0.485] [−2.715,−0.585] [−2.205,−0.605]
(4.5%) (28.3%)
θ2 −1.40 [−2.785,−0.625] [−2.785,−0.725] [−2.245,−0.745]
(4.6%) (30.6%)
Approximate Reduction in Total Area Compared to ΘABJ
I (16.4%) (56.5%)
Table 2: Projections of ΘABJ
I , ΘCT
I and ΘI, and reduction in bounds width compared to ABJ.
Four player, two type entry game with pure strategy Nash equilibrium as solution concept.




θ11 −0.15 [−0.154,−0.144] [−0.153,−0.146] [−0.152,−0.147]
(27%) (54%)
θ21 −0.20 [−0.206,−0.195] [−0.204,−0.197] [−0.203,−0.198]
(27%) (54%)
θ22 −0.10 [−0.106,−0.096] [−0.104,−0.097] [−0.103,−0.098]
(27%) (54%)
Table 3: Projections of ΘABJ
I , ΘCT
I and ΘI, reduction in bounds width (in parentheses), and area
of the identiﬁcation regions compared to ABJ. Two player entry game with correlated equilibrium
as solution concept.




θ1 −1.15 [−4.475,−0.485] [−4.475,−0.585] [−4.125,−0.595]
(2.5%) (11.5%)
θ2 −1.40 [−4.585,−0.625] [−4.585,−0.725] [−4.425,−0.735]
(2.4%) (6.8%)
Approximate Reduction in Total Area Compared to ΘABJ
I (7.9%) (23.1%)
42ε2         
 -θ2
 -θ1      ε1
Sθ = {(0,1),(-ε2/θ2,-ε1/θ1),(1,0)} Sθ = {(0,1)} Sθ = {(1,0)}
Sθ = {(0,1)} Sθ = {(0,1)} Sθ = {(1,1)}
Sθ = {(0,0)} Sθ = {(1,0)} Sθ = {(1,0)}
Figure 1: The random set of mixed strategy NE proﬁles as a function of ε1,ε 2 in a two player entry
game.
ε2         
 -θ2
 -θ1      ε1
Y θ = {(1,0)} Y θ = {(0,0)} Y θ = {(1,0)}
Y θ = {(1,1)}
Y θ = {(0,1)} Y θ = {(0,1),(1,0)} Y θ = {(1,0)}
Y θ = {(0,1)} Y θ = {(0,1)}
Figure 2: The random set of pure strategy NE outcomes as a function of ε1,ε 2 in a two player
entry game.
43ε2         
Yθ = {(2,0)} Yθ = {(0,0)} Yθ = {(0,0)}
 4θ11  3θ11  2θ11 θ11
ε1
Yθ = {(2,0)} Yθ = {(0,0)} Yθ = {(0,0)}
 θ22
Yθ = {(2,0)} Yθ = {(0,1)}
 2θ22
Yθ = {(2,0)} Yθ = {(0,2)} Yθ = {(0,2)}
 θ21 + θ22
Yθ = {(2,0)} Yθ = {(0,2)} Yθ = {(0,2)}
 θ21 + 2θ22
Yθ = {(2,0)} Yθ = {(0,2)} Yθ = {(0,2)}
 2θ21 + θ22
Yθ = {(2,1)} Yθ = {(0,2)} Yθ = {(0,2)}
 2θ21 + 2θ22








Yθ = {(2,0),(0,2)} Yθ = {(1,0),(0,2)}
Yθ = {(1,0)}
Yθ = {(2,0),(1,2)} Yθ = {(2,0),(0,2)}
Yθ = {(2,0)} Yθ = {(2,0)}









Yθ = {(2,0)} Yθ = {(2,0)}
Yθ = {(0,2)}
Figure 3: The random set of pure strategy NE outcomes as a function of ε1,ε 2 in a four player,
two type entry game.
44ε2         
 -θ2
 -θ1      ε1
R θ = {(0,0),(0,1),
(-ε2/θ2,-ε1/θ1),(1,0),(1,1)}
R θ = {(1,0),(1,1)}
R θ = {(0,0)} R θ = {(1,0),(0,0)} R θ = {(1,0)}
R θ = {(0,1),(0,0)}
R θ = {(0,1)} R θ = {(0,1),(1,1)} R θ = {(1,1)}
Figure 4: The random set of level-1 rational proﬁl e sa saf u n c t i o no fε1,ε 2 in a two player entry
game.
ε2         
 -θ2
 -θ1      ε1
C θ = {[1 0 0 0]} C θ = {[0 1 0 0]} C θ = {[0 1 0 0]}
C θ = co[[0 0 1 0],γ1,γ2,γ3,[0 1 0 0]] C θ = {[0 0 1 0]} C θ = {[0 1 0 0]}
C θ = {[0 0 1 0]} C θ = {[0 0 1 0]} C θ = {[0 0 0 1]}
Figure 5: The random set of correlated equilibria for diﬀerent values of ε1 and ε2 in a two player
entry game. The correlated equilibria γ1,γ2,γ3 are deﬁned in Section 6.2.
45Figure 6: Identiﬁcation regions in a two player entry game with mixed strategy Nash equilibrium
as solution concept.
Figure 7: Identiﬁcation regions in a four player, two types entry game with pure strategy Nash
equilibrium as solution concept.
46Figure 8: Upper contours of the identiﬁcation regions in a two player entry game with level-1
rationality as solution concept.
Figure 9: Identiﬁcation regions in a two player entry game with correlated equilibrium as solution
concept.
47